In this paper we provide a general model of 'quaternary'dichotomous voting rules (QVRs), namely, voting rules for making collective dichotomous decisions (to accept or reject a proposal), based on vote pro…les in which four options are available to each voter: voting ('yes', 'no'or 'abstaining') or staying home and not turning out. The model covers most of actual real-world dichotomus rules, where quorums are often required, and some of the extensions considered in the literature. In particular, we address and solve the question of the representability of QVRs by means of weighted rules and extend the notion of 'dimension'of a rule.
Introduction
This paper deals with dichotomous decision-making that specify collective acceptance or collective rejection of a proposal. Most of the social choice literature on dichotomous voting rules considers only binary rules, where the passage or rejection of a proposal is decided on the basis of the votes cast by those who vote 'yes'. This implicitly assumes either that voting 'yes'and 'not'are the only feasible options, or that abstention and not showing up are counted as 'noes'. In the real world rules often distinguish between these options. A well-known example is the UN Security Council. A proposal can be passed if at least nine out of the …fteen members are in favor and no permanent member is against (i.e. all permanent members approve or abstain). In many Parliaments the requirement for passing a bill is often based on the number of members (MPs) present, not on the total number of MPs. Other examples include all rules with a quorum, that is, those that require the presence of a minimum number of voters for a vote to take place.
Still ternary dichotomous voting rules have been studied. Felsenthal and Machover (1997) study rules where the three actions are voting 'yes', voting 'no', and abstention. They deal with the measurement of power in this context. Uleri (2002) , Côrte-Real and Pereira (2004), Herrera and Mattozzi (2010) , and Maniquet and Morelli (2010) study ternary rules where the third option is not participating. They study the strategic aspect induced by the quorum. Dougherty and Edward (2010) compare the simple majority and the absolute majority in a context where all four options (voting 'yes', voting 'no', abstention, and non participation) are possible.
In this paper we extensively study quaternary dichotomous rules. The four possible options are those mentioned above, and the outcome is dichotomous, i.e. either acceptance or rejection of a proposal. This paper is complementary to Zwicker (2003, 2009 ) and Zwicker (2009) . On the one hand, they consider j options and k outcomes, while we focus on 4 inputs and 2 outputs. On the other hand, they study rules with any number of ordered options or levels of support in the input, and any number of ordered levels of approval in the output. We consider the case where levels of support are not necessarily ordered 1 . In particular we study rules with quorum, where the 'not participating'option and the 'no'option cannot be ranked: depending on the vote pro…le, the 'no' option may be more favorable or less favorable to the rejection of the proposal than the 'not participating'option. We extend Freixas and Zwicker's notion of weighted rules, and also de…ne the notion of dimension in this context and prove its well de…nedness.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the general model of 'quaternary' dichotomous voting rule (QVR) is introduced. In Section 3 a lattice of 'monotonic' classes of QVRs (i.e. speci…ed by an admissible notion of monotonicity) is introduced and its basic properties are studied. In Section 4 some real world examples, their monotonicities and minimal monotonic classes containing each of them are examined. In Section 5 the notions of weighted majority rule and dimension are extended for the class of rules introduced here, and the well-de…nedness of the notion of dimension is proved. Finally, we brie ‡y summarize our conclusions and point out some lines of further research.
Quaternary dichotomous rules
A dichotomous voting rule speci…es a collective decision, acceptance or rejection, for each possible vote pro…le. In the binary case usually considered in the literature (see for instance Laruelle and Valenciano, 2008 ) voters can only cast either a positive or a negative vote (or any action other than voting 'yes'counts as voting 'no').
If n is the number of seats on the committee, we label them by 1; 2; ::; n, and N = f1; 2; :::; ng. The same labels are also used to designate the voters that occupy the corresponding seats. A (binary) vote con…guration is a 2-partition of N , (S Y ; S N ), where S Y is the set of yes voters. Then a binary dichotomous voting rule speci…es a set V 2 N of 'winning con…gurations'(i.e. those which lead to the acceptance of the proposal)
S leads to acceptance that satis…es the following conditions. First, if all voters vote 'yes', the proposal should be adopted ('full-support' condition): (N ; ?) 2 V; second, if all voters vote 'no' (or none votes 'yes') the proposal should be rejected ('null-support'condition): (?; N ) = 2 V; and third, if a vote con…guration is winning, then any other con…guration with a larger set of 'yes'-voters is also winning ('monotonicity' condition): if S 2 V and S
A fourth condition is usually added. The possibility of a proposal and its negation both being accepted should be prevented. If a proposal leads to a con…guration S, its opposite should lead to the con…guration T where T Y = S N . Both con…gurations should not be winning: if S 2 V then T = 2 V. In this case the rule is called proper. A binary dichotomous rule that does not satisfy this condition is said to be improper. Most binary rules in the real world are proper. Nevertheless, it proves convenient to widen the class so as to include improper rules within the domain of voting rules.
In general, more options than 'yes'or 'no'are o¤ered to voters and the …nal outcome may be sensitive to these options. Here we are interested in this more general type of voting rule. We consider the quaternary case where four di¤erent options are o¤ered to each voter: a voter may not show up at the vote, may turn up but abstain, may come and vote yes or may come and vote no 2 . The precise account of a particular vote is speci…ed by a vote con…guration or vote pro…le S = (S Y ; S A ; S H ; S N ) that keeps track of the action taken by the voter occupying each seat, where S Y is the set of 'yes'-voters, S N is the set of 'no'-voters, S A is the set of those who participate and abstain and S H that of those who do not participate or 'stay at home'. A (quaternary) vote con…guration is thus in general a 4-partition of N , i.e. any two of these subsets are disjoint and Now let us consider what conditions may reasonably be imposed on such a set of winning con…gurations for a sound and general enough notion of voting rule. Note that monotonicity for actual rules with a quorum is di¤erent from that for binary dichotomous rules, in that a con…guration can be winning, while a con…guration with a larger set of 'yes'-voters (and a smaller set of 'no'-voters) may be losing, as the following example shows:
Example 1 In the Belgian Parliament, a bill must receive more votes in favor than votes against in order to be passed, and a quorum of 76 (out of 150 MPs) is required. If 50 MPs go and vote 'yes', 30 go and vote 'no' and 70 are absent, the proposal is accepted, while if 60 MPs vote 'yes'and 90 are absent, the proposal is rejected.
In the example the set of 'yes'-voters is not extended exclusively at the expense of the set of no-voters, the set of voters who stay at home also becomes larger. If the set of 'yes'-voters is extended exclusively at the expense of the 'no'-voters a winning con…guration should not become losing. We refer to this condition as NY-monotonicity. In similar terms we de…ne and assume AY-monotonicity (extension of the set of 'yes'-voters solely at the expense of the abstainers), and HY-monotonicity (extension of the set of 'yes'-voters solely at the expense of the voters who stay at home). We thus have three monotonicity conditions:
The following diagram represents these three monotonicities, that is, the transitions of votes that keep a winning vote con…guration winning ('No'!'Yes', etc.) that we assume for any dichotomous rule based on such voting pro…les:
whose usual set-theoretic notation is fY; A; H; N g N : 4 A more suitable term in this setting, where a vote pro…le cannot be summarized by the set of 'yes'-voters as it must include at least those that have chosen three di¤erent actions, would be 'accepting con…guration'or 'yes-winning con…guration'. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity we maintain the term 'winning con…guration'.
Most real world voting rules satisfy further monotonicities (see the next section). Nevertheless we include only these basic ones in the basic de…nition of voting rule in order to have a su¢ ciently general notion. Now let us consider the extension of the other two properties satis…ed by binary rules for a set W 4 N . Full support of a proposal should imply its acceptance, thus we impose:
Full-support: A set W 4 N is said to satisfy the full-support condition if a unanimous 'yes'leads to the acceptance of the proposal: If S Y = N , then S 2 W.
As to the extension of 'null-support'condition the situation is more delicate. An obvious extension is this:
N is said to satisfy the null-support condition if the proposal is rejected in case of null support: If
Nevertheless, if we want to avoid clashes with some con…gurations of monotonicities that are to be found in the speci…cation of some real world voting rules, then this condition is too strong. For instance a quorum requirement considers as equivalent the options of voting 'yes', 'no'and abstaining. In the corresponding rule a con…guration where S Y = ? (but S A 6 = ?) could be winning. Thus we weaken the 'null-support' condition in order to avoid ruling out such rules 5 . To that end we need a previous notion. Let X; Z be two options, i.e. X; Z 2 fY; A; H; N g, and W 4 N : We say that X and Z are 'equivalent in W'and write X W Z, if for all S 2 4
; and S V = T V for all action V 2 fY; A; H; N g n fZ; Xg:
Now we can formulate a weak version of 'null-support'for this type of rule:
Weak null-support: A set W 4 N is said to satisfy the weak null-support condition if for all S 2 W, either S Y 6 = ? or there exists X 2 fA; H; N g s.t. X W Y and
This condition is obviously weaker than 'null-support'and equivalent when no action is equivalent to voting 'yes'. Adding this condition and that of 'full-support'to the above monotonicities we de…ne what in the sequel we refer to as a 'quaternary' dichotomous rule.
De…nition 1 An n-voter 'quaternary dichotomous voting rule' (QVR) is a set W of 4-partitions of N that satis…es full-support, weak null-support, NY-monotonicity, AYmonotonicity and HY-monotonicity. 5 In real world rules a participation quorum is usually associated with other requirements that break the equivalence between the 'yes'option and the others.
Remark: Given the monotonicities assumed, the 'full-support'condition can be replaced by this:
The following preorders (i.e. binary re ‡exive and transitive relations) on the set of vote con…gurations can be naturally associated with each of the three basic monotonicities assumed:
By means of these relations, by just replacing 'XY 'by the desired monotonicity (i.e. N Y , AY or HY ), the three monotonicities assumed can be expressed in the form: A rule W veri…es XY -monotonicity if
entirely analogous to the monotonicity condition for binary rules: preorder ' XY ' merely replaces 'S Y T Y '. As has been done for each of these monotonicities separately, when all three of them are assumed it is possible to formulate all their implications by means of a single preorder QV R , given by the transitive closure of the union of the preorders associated with each of the three monotonicities, as stated explicitly by the following: De…nition 2 Given two vote con…gurations, S and T , S QV R T if and only if there exists a …nite sequence of vote con…gurations S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k such that S 1 = S, S k = T and for all j = 1; 2; ::; k 1: S j XY S j+1; where ' XY 'is any of the relations de…ned by (1), (2) 
or (3).
Now it is possible to express the three monotonicities by a single implication which yields the following alternative de…nition of QVR:
De…nition 3 An n-voter quaternary voting rule is a nonempty set W of 4-partitions of N that satis…es weak null-support and such that
where QV R is the relation given by De…nition 2.
Preorder QV R can also be formulated exclusively in terms of con…gurations S and T as the following proposition shows: Proposition 1 For any two vote con…gurations S and T :
Proof: ()) Assume S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S k are such that S 1 = S, S k = T and for all j = 1; 2; ::; k 1: S j XY S j+1 : Then, from (1), (2) and (3), it can thus immediately be concluded that for any j = 1; 2; ::; k 1, we have:
. Thus the three inclusions hold for S and T . (() Now, reciprocally, assume that the three inclusions hold for S and T . Then let S 1 , S 2 , S 3 and S 4 be the following con…gurations:
and S 4 = T . Then we have
The latter because
The preorder QV R allows us to formulate the notion of 'minimal'vote con…guration (relative to the monotonicities summarized by QV R ), i.e. those winning con…gurations whose winning character cannot be inferred from that of other con…gurations and the three monotonicity conditions.
De…nition 4 A vote con…guration S 2 4
N is 'minimal winning' in rule W w.r.t.
QV R if S 2 W and there is no other winning con…guration T such that T QV R S (i.e. such that T QV R S but S QV R T ); and S is 'maximal losing' w.r.t. QVR if S = 2 W and there is no other losing con…guration T such that S QV R T .
A rule is anonymous if a vote con…guration is winning or not dependent solely on the number of voters of each type.
De…nition 5 A quaternary dichotomous voting rule is 'anonymous' if for all S 2 W and all T such that
When the rule is anonymous the inclusions (5) that de…ne the binary relation QV R can be replaced by a set of inequalities involving the cardinalities of the sets of di¤erent types of vote. It is enough to replace each set by its cardinality (e.g. S Y by s Y , etc.), and replacing ' 'by ' '. Thus, we have the following self-contained de…nition:
De…nition 6 An anonymous quaternary voting rule (AnQVR) is a nonempty set W of 4-partitions of N that satis…es weak null-support and such that
where AnQV R is the relation given by
Finally, the notion of 'proper' rule remains to be extended to this wider class of rules, but we postpone this to the next section.
The lattice of classes of monotonic QVRs
All real world dichotomous voting rules based on the four options satisfy the three monotonicities considered so far, and consequently …t into the above general de…nition. Nevertheless, actual dichotomous voting rules often satisfy further monotonicities.
De…nition 7 Given any two options
where
By assuming di¤erent combinations of monotonicities (in addition to the three basic ones), a complete lattice of subclasses of QVRs related by inclusion arises. In the next section we constrain our attention to some combinations of monotonicities to be found in real world examples. Nevertheless it is convenient …rst to establish a few basic facts about the general lattice that will be useful later.
In what follows we refer to subclasses of n-voter QVRs (denoted by C, C 1 , C 2 etc.) monotonic in the following sense: De…nition 8 A class of 'monotonic'QVRs is a class of QVRs that contains all QVRs that satisfy a speci…c set of XZ-monotonicities that includes the three basic ones.
Note that as a class C of monotonic QVRs is characterized by a set of monotonicities, all the monotonicities within the class can be summarized in the form:
where C is the preorder determined by the monotonicities that characterize C, as has been done for the whole class of QVRs. As in the case of QV R , it is given by the transitive closure of the union of the preorders associated with each of those monotonicities. In the next section some monotonic classes and their associated preorders are explicitly speci…ed, but here we provide a list of all possible 'constellations' of monotonicities. In order to simplify the list, we use the following notation fV; X; Zg = fA; H; N g, and 'X ! Z'means that XZ-monotonicity holds, while 'X Z'means that these options are interchangeable as both X ! Z and Z ! X hold. In the diagrams we omit those monotonicities that are implied by those that are stated explicitly: for instance, in 
-With up to four di¤erent options there are …ve possibilities:
Observe that each monotonic class C is speci…ed by a combination of monotonicities that …ts one of the above diagrams, which can be seen as a preorder C over the set of options fY; A; H; N g (that determines a preorder C over vote con…gurations). In some cases the preorder over the set of options is linear (i.e. it is complete and transitive). This is the case for all monotonicity con…gurations with only one or two options, but also for the …rst three of those with 3 options and the …rst one with 4 options. In what follows we refer to such monotonic classes of QVRs as the 'linear classes' in reference to this linear preorder, and we refer as 'linear rules' to those that belong to any of these classes.
Then we have the following de…nitions and facts that state some general conclusions about these classes and these QVRs, some of which are used later (their proof is given in an Appendix). The reader less interested in technical details may skip the rest of this section and go directly to Section 4.
First note that the notions of minimal winning and maximal losing con…guration are relative to the preorder over vote con…gurations that summarizes the monotonicities that characterize the monotonic class within which we are working. That is, if C is the preorder associated with class C, we denote
Then we have the following relations.
Proposition 2 Let C 1 and C 2 be two classes of monotonic QVRs, then:
Given two classes of monotonic QVRs, C 1 and C 2 , we call their 'meet', and denote by C 1^C2 , to the class of monotonic QVRs that satisfy all the monotonicities in C 1 and all the monotonicities in C 2 , and call their 'join', and denote by C 1 _ C 2 , to the class of monotonic QVRs that satisfy all the monotonicities that hold both in C 1 and in C 2 . In fact '^'('_') gives the greatest (least) lower (upper) bound of any two classes in the complete lattice of all monotonic classes partially ordered by inclusion. The minimal element in the lattice is the class where all monotonicities hold, which contains only the degenerated rule where all vote con…gurations are winning (…rst in the list of classes given above). Note that this rule satis…es 'full-support'and 'weak null-support'. The maximal class is that of all QVRs (last in the list given above). Meet and join are related with union and intersection by the following proposition, whose simple proof is omitted.
Proposition 3 Let C 1 and C 2 be two monotonic classes of QVRs, then: (i) C 1^C2 = C 1 \ C 2 and C 1^C2 is the transitive closure of C 1 [ C 2 ; and (ii)
The union and the intersection are means of de…ning new rules from preexisting ones, and we are interested in how properties and these operations interact. Let us examine …rst the basic conditions and then the monotonicities. As to the monotonicities we have:
Proposition 5 Let C 1 and C 2 be two classes of QVRs speci…ed by sets of monotonicities with associated preorders C 1 and C 2 . If W 1 2 C 1 , and W 2 2 C 2 , then
In section 5 we address the representability of QVRs by means of weighted rules. The following result will be useful there:
Proposition 6 Let C 1 and C 2 be two monotonic classes of QVRs and C = C 1 _ C 2 , then for all W 2 C there exist W 1 2 C 1 and W 2 2 C 2 such that W = W 1 \ W 2 .
We now extend the notion of 'proper' rule to the class of QVRs. The point of this condition, satis…ed by all binary rules by means of which issues of substance are decided upon, is to prevent two disjoint groups of voters with opposed preferences from both being winning when supporting opposite proposals. The di¢ culty of extending this condition to QVRs is that for real world rules that can be expressed as QVRs it is often the case that two disjoint groups of voters can win a vote if a su¢ cient number of voters abstain and/or do not turn out. For instance, if only more 'yes'than 'no'voters is required in addition to a certain quorum (i.e. a certain maximal number of stayingat-home voters) to pass a decision, this may happen. But no real problem arises, as it is the result of admitting abstention and staying at home as legitimate options for possibly indi¤erent voters. The problem arises if this may also happen in cases where all voters have strict preferences either for approval or rejection of a proposal. This motivates the following Alternatively, the notion of the associated core rule can also be formulated as a QVR:
De…nition 10 The 'core QVR'associated with a QVR W is the QVR W := fS 2 4 N : S Y is strong winning in Wg:
Observe that in this formulation W W. In fact, the core rule W is the maximal QVR in the class Y " A H N contained in W, which motivates the term 'core'rule. Now we can formulate a sensible notion of properness for QVRs consistent with the usual notion for binary rules.
De…nition 11 A quaternary voting rule W is 'proper' if the associated core binary rule is proper.
The following straightforward fact is interesting when de…ning rules by intersection of others.
Proposition 7
The intersection of two QVRs is proper if at least one of them is proper.
Some examples and classes of QVRs rules
The preceding section adopted a very general point of view for a general study the lattice of classes of monotonic QVRs. In this section, based on actual majority rules used in Parliaments, we examine systematically real world examples in the light of the model adopted here. For each example we check the combination of monotonicities that identify the minimal monotonic class containing each of them. Finally, we identify the minimal monotonic class containing all these classes and examples. (C1) A simple majority with a quorum
is used in Parliaments such as those of Belgium and Italy. The monotonicity diagram of the minimal monotonic class containing it and the associated preorder are:
(C2) A majority of present voters with a quorum
is used in the Spanish and German Parliaments. The monotonicity diagram of the minimal monotonic class containing it and the associated preorder are:
(C3) A simple majority (with no quorum):
is used in the Swedish Parliament. The monotonicity diagram and the associated preorder are:
(C4) A majority of members present (used in the Finnish Parliament)
and a majority of those present with an approval threshold (used in the Greek Parliament)
have the same monotonicity diagram and associated preorder, which are:
(C5) An absolute 3=5-majority
is used in some Parliaments such as that of Estonia (in order to amend the Constitution) or that of Poland (to overrule the veto of the President). The monotonicity diagram of the minimal monotonic class containing it and the associated preorder are:
Observe that all preceding examples verify N A-monotonicity (for a precise de…n-ition just replace 'XZ-' by 'N A-' in Def. 7). If we add this condition to the three basic ones, we specify the class of 'N A-monotonic' rules, whose associated diagram and preorder are
In fact, as the reader may easily check, this class is the minimal monotonic class containing all the preceding classes and examples. In fact, we know no actual rule that …ts in the QVR model provided here and does no belong to this class, with the sole exception of the voting rule that was used in the US Congress till 1890 6 . According to this rule abstaining could be more e¤ective for rejection than voting 'no', a sort of simple majority with a 'votes-cast'quorum:
The rule was abandoned when Speaker Thomas Reed replaced the 'votes-cast'quorum by a traditional quorum 7 . is a monotonic class of QVRs according to general De…nition 1.
It is worth remarking that even purely 'auxiliary'rules that specify quorum requirements belong to the class of N A-monotonic rules. For instance, if n 2 q n, then the rule that speci…es q-quorum requirement,
displays Y A-monotonicity and Y H-monotonicity. Thus the monotonicity diagram of the minimal monotonic class containing it and the associated preorder are 8 :
This class is obviously contained in that of N A-monotonic rules.
Remarks: (i) Classes C1 and C2 are not covered by previous models in the literature. In both cases N H-monotonicity does not hold and as a result it may be preferable for a voter against the proposal to stay at home rather than come and vote 'no' 9 .
(ii) At the other extreme, class C5 is isomorphic to that of classical binary voting rules. In other words, the general model of QVR includes the binary model as a particular case.
(iii) In classes C2 and C3 and C4 two options collapse by identi…cation into one (A and N in C2 and C4, H and A in C3), thus leaving only three really di¤erent options. Felsenthal and Machover's (1997) 'ternary'voting rules correspond to class C3 as they consider 'yes', 'no' and 'abstention' as separate options and the monotonicities that they assume are precisely the ones for this class. Observe that the rules in classes C2 and C4 could also be called 'ternary'(as there are actually three options: Y , N and A H) but they are not covered by the model considered by Felsenthal and Machover.
(iv) Classes C3 and C4 can be seen as (3; 2)-rules and C5 as (2; 2)-rules in the terms of Freixas and Zwicker (2003) .
(v) As with the general class of QVRs, for each of the monotonic classes considered above the preorder associated with its subclass of anonymous rules can be speci…ed by replacing each set by its cardinality (e.g. S Y by s Y , etc.), ' 'by ' 'and '['by '+'in the di¤erent de…nitions. For instance, the binary relation associated with anonymous rules in the monotonic class C4 is de…ned by
Then, condition (S 2 W and S AnC4 T ) ) T 2 W; along with nonemptiness and 'weak null-support'speci…es the anonymous subclass of C4. All the the other classes can be similarly 'anonymized'.
Weighted QVRs and dimension
The simplest and best known binary dichotomous voting rules are weighted q-majority voting rules. In fact, most binary rules to be found in real world collective decision bodies are either of this type or such that their sets of winning vote con…gurations are the intersections of the sets of winning con…gurations of two or more such rules. In this section, based on Freixas and Zwicker (2003), we extend the notion of weighted q-majority voting rule to the wider domain of quaternary voting rules and address the question of the representability of quaternary voting rules as (or by means of) such weighted quaternary q-majority voting rules. A binary weighted majority rule is speci…ed by a system of weights w = (w 1 ; ::; w n ), and a quota Q > 0, so that the …nal result is 'yes'if the sum of the weights in favor of the proposal is larger than the quota. Denoting this rule by B(Q; w), we have:
As is well known, not all binary voting rules can be represented in this way: some can only be represented by a double weighted majority, triple majority, etc. A k-multiple binary weighted majority rule is speci…ed by k systems of weights w r = (w r1 ; ::; w rn ), where w ri represents the weight of voter i in rule r, and k quotas Q r (r = 1; 2; ::; k), each quota Q r corresponding to w r system of weights. The …nal result is 'yes'if for all systems the sum of the weights in favor of the proposal is larger than the corresponding quota. The resulting rule is
w ri > Q r , for all r = 1; 2; ::; kg;
Taylor and Zwicker (1992, 1993, 1999) give necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a binary voting rule to be representable as a weighted majority rule, and introduce the notion of the dimension of a binary voting rule as the minimum number of weighted majority rules necessary to represent the voting rule (i.e. the minimum k for which the rule can be expressed in the form (7). This notion is well de…ned as they prove that any binary voting rule can be represented in this way.
We now extend the notion of weighted majority rule to the class of quaternary voting rules dealt with in this paper. We use the following notation: 
Such a rule is denoted by Q(Q; w Y ; w A ; w H ; w N ).
This de…nition 10 constrains the weights by (8) so as to make the rule consistent with the basic monotonicities assumed for all QVRs. Moreover, the ranking of the weights corresponds to the monotonicities. For the case of the linear classes, given the fact that these classes correspond to the possible orders between weights consistent with the constraints in De…nition 13, the result of Freixas and Zwicker (2003) applies straightforwardly. That is, their characterization theorem answers the question of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the representability of a linear QVR as a (single) weighted rule. But there is the question of the well-de…nedness of the notion of 'dimension' for general quaternary rules. The following result extends the proof of Taylor and Zwicker (1999) to the case of linear classes of monotonic rules, showing that the notion of dimension is sound for quaternary rules in the linear classes.
Theorem 1 Let C be a linear class of monotonic rules, then for any rule W 2 C there exists a dichotomous quaternary k-multiple weighted rule Q such that W = Q.
Proof. We provide the proof for class C4, whose monotonicities are
but the proof is entirely analogous for any linear class. With the notation introduced in Section 3, we have N < C4 H < C4 A < C4 Y . Given a vote con…guration S = (S Y ; S A ; S H ; S N ), for each i 2 N and X 2 fY; A; H; N g, we denote S 1 (i) = X if i 2 S X . Let W be a rule in C4. The proof consists of constructing a weighted rule for each maximal (w.r.t. C4 ) losing vote con…guration, and showing that W is the intersection of all of them.
, such that Q L = 1=2, and its weight system is given by:
= fLg (to see this, note that the cells in the diagonal contain the weights to be added corresponding to vote con…guration L, all of them 0, and any transfer of votes from this con…guration in the sense of the monotonicities in C4 would yield a winning con…gu-ration). Then we have
In other words, W is a quaternary k-multiple weighted rule with k = #M axl C4 (W).
satis…es full support and null support, but, as is the case for binary rules (see Taylor and Zwicker, 1999) , it is not proper in the sense of Def. 11.
Therefore there only remains the question of the representability of QVRs in the 'non linear'classes. In view of Theorem 1, it is enough to prove that any rule in any class that is not linear can be represented as the intersection of a …nite set of linear rules. In fact, this can be derived as a consequence of Szpilrajn's (1930) extension theorem, given that any partial order can be extended to a linear order and is the intersection of all such extensions. Nevertheless, we provide a direct proof showing in addition that only two linear rules are needed.
Corollary 1 All quaternary voting rules can be represented as the intersection of a …-nite number of weighted QVRs. In particular, non linear QVRs can only be represented as the intersection of at least two weighted QVRs.
Proof. By Theorem 1, all linear rules are representable in this way. By Proposition 8, non linear QVRs can be represented as the intersection of two linear ones, but never as a single linear rule. This is because a weighted QVR is always linear.
Therefore the notion of dimension of a QVR as the minimum number of weighted QVRs by means of which it can be expressed 12 is well de…ned for any QVR, and non linear QVRs have at least dimension two.
Concluding remarks
We have provided a model of quaternary voting rule that covers dichotomous rules admitting abstention and 'staying home'as legitimate and possibly di¤erentiated options, and covers all real world dichotomous voting rules based on these four options and di¤erent types of 'quorum'that we know of. The model extends consistently simpler models such as binary and ternary voting rules. In particular, notions such as that of 'proper'rule and 'minimal winning'and 'maximal losing'vote con…gurations have been naturally extended. We have also extended the notion of weighted rule to this enlarged class of rules and the notion of dimension. We have also proved the representability of all QVR as the intersection of such weighted rules.
As main lines of further research, the following seem worth investigating. For binary dichotomous voting rules actions trivially follow preferences, at least when no indi¤erences occur. Assuming that voting is not costly, a rational voter in favour of the proposal should vote 'yes', and a rational voter against should vote 'no'. Under the same assumptions, for quaternary voting rules a voter against the proposal may be better o¤ by staying at home than voting 'no'and game-theoretic considerations are pertinent. The framework provided suggests a study of di¤erent classes of rules and rules to be found in parliaments from this point of view. The framework provided also suggests a systematic study of di¤erent anonymous majority rules in parliaments and other decision-making bodies, and perhaps founding reasonable proposals.
Proof of Proposition 4
Parts ( 
Proof of Proposition 6
Let C denote the preorder associated with class C and W 2 C, so that we have: W = fT 2 4 N : S C T for some S 2 M inw C (W)g:
Let C 1 and C 2 denote the preorders associated with C 1 and C 2 . Let W 1 and W 2 be the rules de…ned by:
N : S C 1 T for some S 2 M inw C (W)g and W 2 = fT 2 4 N : S C 2 T for some S 2 M inw C (W)g:
Then, as can easily be checked, W 1 and W 2 satisfy 'full-support' and 'weak nullsupport'. Thus, obviously, W 1 2 C 1 , W 2 2 C 2 , and we have W 1 \ W 2 = fT 2 4 N : S C 1 T , S C 2 T for some S 2 M inw C (W)g = fT 2 4 N : S T for some S 2 M inw C (W)g; where = C 1 \ C 2 , and as C = C 1 _ C 2 , by Prop. 14 we have, C 1 \ C 2 = C . Then we conclude
N : S C T and S 2 M inw C (W)g = W.
